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JOINT TENANCY FOR WASHINGTON?
HARRY M. CROSS*
Recurring proposals' to make joint tenancy ownership generally2
available in Washington justify consideration of possible consequences
of such a change from what has been the pattern of law since terri-
torial days except for the aberration for a few years beginning in 1940.'
The absence of joint tenancies in general has probably put both the
ordinary rules and the special complications of joint tenancy law be-
yond the ken of the typical Washington lawyer, hence a rudimentary
summary of that law is desirable.
Joint tenancy is a form of co-ownership by two or more persons in
which each co-owner stands in the same relationship to the asset as
each other co-owner as regards the time of acquisition, the method of
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'There have been a number: Most recently H.B. No. 89 and H.B. No. 178, 1959
legislature, which did not pass; and currently Initiative No. 208.
2 That is, other than in U.S. savings bonds held in co-ownership, where the survivor
is stated to be sole owner, Treas. Reg., Code Fed. Reg. Title 31, part 315; RCW
11.04.230; and the "bank" accounts under RCW 30.20.015 as to commercial banks;
RCW 32.12.030(3) as to mutual savings banks; RCW 33.20.030 as to savings and
loan associations; and RCW 31.12.140 as to credit unions. This discussion does not
purport to cover complications of ownership of these assets.
8 Although it is not entirely accurate to say joint tenancies, generally, do not exist
in Washington because the statute only eliminated the incident of survivorship (but
compare Holohan v. Melville, 41 Wn.2d 380, 393, 249 P.2d 777, 785 (1952)), that
incident is most important and its elimination probably ends any particular utility of a
joint tenancy. The present statute, RCW 11.04.070 enacted in 1953, is essentially a
strengthening of the policy against survivorship, first adopted by the Act of Dec. 23,
1885, Wash. Terr. Laws 1885, p. 165, § 1, and unchanged until 1953, to preclude avoid-
ance of the restriction by a contract for survivorship which the court first permitted
in In re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940), or by exhibiting an intention
to create a right of survivorship as suggested in Holohan v. Melville, supra. Avoid-
ance of an anti-survivorship policy by contract is known elsewhere, see, e.g., 18 TEXAS
L. REv. 232 (1940) ; 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 118 (1957) ; and even the present law probably
does not prevent creation of an estate in a surviving cotenant by means of contingent
remainders after a joint life estate or an executory limitation to a surviving co-owner,
but these are not joint tenancy rights of survivorship and besides vary from the joint
tenancy incident in being indestructible (probably). See O'Connell, Are Joint Tenan-
cies Abolished in Oregon, 21 ORE. L. REv. 159 (1942); 4 POWEL, Real Property
1 616 (1954) [hereafter referred to as POWELL]; 2 Am. LAW PROP. § 6.3 (1952) [here-
after referred to as PROP.].
RCW 11.04.070 is as follows: "Survivorship between joint tenants abolished-
Exceptions. The right of survivorship by agreement or otherwise as a principle and
as an incident of joint tenancy or of tenancy by the entireties is abolished. If partition
is not made between joint tenants, the parts of those who die first shall not accrue to
the survivors, but descend, or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts and other
legal charges, or transmissible to executors or administrators, and be considered, to
every intent and purpose, in the same view as if such deceased joint tenants had been
tenants in common: Provided, That this section shall not apply in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) As between husband and wife in dealing with community property
as otherwise provided by statute, (2) As to property and rights where the right of
survivorship has been or may be revived by statute, (3) As to property and rights
conveyed to trustees while subject to the trust. [1953 c 270 § 1; 1885 p 165 § 1; RRS
§ 1344.]"
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acquisition, the interest acquired, and the right to possession. It is
commonly stated that if these four "unities" (time, title, interest and
possession) do not exist the co-owners are not joint tenants, even
though there was an attempt to create a joint tenancy or there pre-
viously was a joint tenancy.4 The principal difference of consequence
between the joint tenancy and a tenancy in common in the inter vivos
relationship is in the "interest" unity;5 i.e., the share size is the same
for each joint tenant (if two, each a half; if three, each a third; etc.)
whereas the share size of tenants in common can vary, usually accord-
ing to the contribution each makes, although there is a presumption
of equal shares;' and the estates must be similar for each joint tenant,
thus there could not be a joint tenancy if one owner had a life estate
in half and the other a fee estate in the other half!
"Survivorship" is the important incident of joint tenancy. The op-
erative effect of this incident is to free the surviving joint tenant or
tenants from the claims or interests of the deceased joint tenant. The
theory is that each joint tenant has total ownership of the asset8 in
addition to his share interest relevant only in determining inter vivos
relationships. Taking by survivorship then does not amount to an in-
heritance or even a transfer at the death of one.' The survivor, not
being a successor, holds the asset free of any claims against the de-
cedent.1" There is no comparable concept in tenancy in common; rather
when one tenant in common dies his share goes to his successors (heirs
or devisees) and not to the other tenant in common, as such. Hence
the right of survivorship is operative only if there is a joint tenancy
at the time of death of one co-owner.
"Severance" destroys the joint tenancy and therefore the right of
survivorship. Much of joint tenancy law is concerned with this inci-
dent of severability. When one or more of the four unities is destroyed
the joint tenancy is gone. Thus if A, joint tenant with B, conveys his
interest to C there cannot be a joint tenancy between B and C for there
is neither unity of time nor of title between B and C, and neither B
42 PROP. §§ 6.1, 62; 14 Am. Jul. Cotenancy § 7; 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy § 3c.
(Subsequent references to Am. JuR. and C.J.S. will be to these titles unless otherwise
indicated.)
5 2 PROP. § 6.1. For simplicity discussion herein is based on a joint tenancy between
two persons though there can of course be more.
6 Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957) ; 2 PROP., § 6.5; 4 Powau.
601; Am. JuR. § 17; 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in Comno, § 18.
72 PROP. § 6.1.
82 PROP. §§ 6.1, 6.2; 4 Pow=u. 619.
9 Am. JuR. § 6; C.J.S. § lb.
104 Powm. f1 618; Am. JuR. § 6; C.J.S. § lb.
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nor C would be total owner through survivorship if one died. Each
joint tenant has the right voluntarily to sever the joint tenancy and
further severance can occur involuntarily when a creditor sells the
fractional interest of his joint tenant debtor. Severance is, however,
an inter vivos phenomenon and the attempt of one joint tenant to dis-
pose of his share by will fails against the operation of the right of
survivorship."
In the early law the insulation of surviving joint tenants from cred-
itors of a deceased joint tenant probably was an inducement to the
use of joint tenancies, but the principal advantages were in avoidance
of burdensome feudal incidents enforceable upon the death of an owner
and in avoidance of dower estates for the widow of a deceased joint
tenant. Elimination of the most burdensome feudal incidents also re-
moved a principal demand for the use of joint tenancies, and the frus-
tration of the reasonable expectations of heirs of a deceased joint tenant
loomed larger in the appraisal of the device. The result in the United
States and elsewhere has been a reversal of the preference for finding
a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common. The modern pref-
erence is reflected in statutes which abolish joint tenancies, eliminate
the incident of survivorship, or provide that co-ownership will be a
tenancy in common unless there is a sufficient expression of an intent
to create a joint tenancy rather than the preferred tenancy in common.
The preference is frequently buttressed by rigorously applying techni-
calities of creation to frustrate even a clear expression of intention to
create a joint tenancy. 2
At one time use of a joint tenancy removed the asset from inherit-
ance taxation comparably to the old avoidance of the feudal incident
burdens at death, but this is no longer true 3 and death tax burdens
may even be greater when the device is used. 4 Somewhat comparable
is the desire to avoid the expenses of "probate" by removing an asset
(through survivorship) from the estate of a deceased joint tenant. Ex-
perience in other states suggests there is substantial doubt whether as
11 Severance, generally: 2 PROP., § 6.2; 4 POWELL 618; Am. JUR. § 14; C.J.S. § 4;
Romig and Shelton, Severance of a Joint Tenancy in California, 8 HASTINGS L. J. 290(1957).
12 As to the preferences and modern statutes, generally: 2 PROp. § 6.3; 4 POWELL
i 602; Am. JUR. §§ 11, 12, 13; C.J.S. §§ 2, 3d.
134 POWELL ff 619. Cf. In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935)
(account went by survivorship not inheritance, no inheritance tax) and Nelson v.
Olympia Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 193 Wash. 222, 74 P.2d 1019 (1938) (change
in inheritance tax statute made taking by survivorship taxable. Statute now RCW
83.04.020.)
14 See discussion infra, text for notes 49 infra.
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a practical matter "death" costs are likely to be reduced by use of joint
tenancies.15
But even if it is assumed that this saving may be realized in some
instances there remains the question of whether the addition of joint
tenancy possibilities to Washington law would not raise complexities
which would be more expensive to resolve than the possible cost of
not using the device. When it is appreciated that litigation, perhaps
acrimonious, is likely against the person claiming ownership by sur-
vivorship when unintended results occur or heirs' or creditors' expect-
ancies are frustrated if the joint tenancy rules control, the importance
of the possibility of this sort of expense becomes apparent. While
much of the following discussion is relevant to joint tenancies under
any proposal, the language of the current proposal, Initiative 208, will
frequently be used as a reference point.1"
Initially there would arise problems of creation of the joint tenancy.
Section 1 provides in part, "Joint tenancy may be created by written
agreement, written transfer, deed, will or other instrument of convey-
ance, when expressly declared therein to be a joint tenancy.. ." The
requirement of a writing probably would eliminate some controversy,
but the proposal apparently contemplates writings of an informal
character which might be prepared and become operative against a
person unaware of the consequences. The problem of the sufficiency
of a declaration of joint tenancy is also raised. Would a conveyance
16 See, e.g., Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxvwise ana! Otherwise, 40 CALIF. L. REV.
501 (1952); Report of Comm. on State and Federal Taxation, 1954 Proceedings,
Probate and Trust Law Divisions, Amer. Bar Ass'n. Section on Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust law at. 65.
10 [Initiative 20] AN ACT relating to joint tenancies permitting property to pass
to the survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings, and protecting rights
of creditors, and relating to other property interests, and repealing section 1, page
165, Laws of 1885, section 1, chapter 270, Laws of 1953 and RCW 11.04.070.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
Section 1. Whereas joint tenancy with right of survivorship permits property to
pass to the survivor without the cost or delay of probate proceedings, there shall be a
form of co-ownership of property, real and personal, known as joint tenancy. A joint
tenancy shall have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common law.
Joint tenancy may be created by written agreement, written transfer, deed, will or
other instrument of conveyance, when expressly declared therein to be a joint tenancy,
or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants: PROVIDED
HOWEVER, That such transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors.
Section 2. Every interest created in favor of two or more persons, in their own
right is an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership, for partnership
purposes, or unless declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy, as provided in section
1, or unless acquired as community property or unless acquired by executors or trustees.
Section 3. The provisions of this act shall not restrict the creation of a joint ten-
ancy in a bank deposit or in other choses in action as heretofore or hereafter provided
by law, nor restrict the power of husband and wife to make agreements as provided
in RCW 26.16.120.
Section 4. Section 1, page 165, Laws of 1885, section 1, chapter 270, Laws of 1953,
and RCW 11.04.070 are each repealed.
1960]
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to two persons "jointly" be enough? Would conveyance to two per-
sons "with right of survivorship" or some such language create a joint
tenancy? Other possible variations' will occur to the reader, and with-
out definitive answers by the supreme court there would be no way to
be sure that any language which did not expressly state "joint ten-
ancy" did or did not create the relationship. Of course one could ex-
pect publication by the stationers of forms which would have language
clearly sufficient to express the intent, and assuming that such a form
was purposely used and the joint tenancy results were contemplated,
the problem merely shifts to the technicalities of creating such an in-
tended relationship.
If an owner, A, desires to create a joint tenancy for himself and B,
the technicality of the unities of time and title must be considered. A
common form used in this situation has been a deed from A to A and
B as joint tenants, but since a person cannot convey to himself the
effect of the deed could well be merely to create a tenancy in common
for A and B, B having acquired his interest at a different time and by
a different deed than did A. The effective method against this techni-
cality is for A to convey to a stranger, X, who executes the joint ten-
ancy deed to A and B. 8 In many states statutes have been enacted
to eliminate this foolishness, but with no relevant statutes in Wash-
ington there is no way of being sure what device can safely be used.'"
If the two persons initially acquire the asset from a third person
(no matter who pays for it) the problem of the preceding paragraph
would not arise, but if the two are husband and wife and the acquisi-
tion is with community funds a different problem would arise. Unless
both participate in the acquisition agreeing to the character of title
taken and this can be proved, creation of a joint tenancy can be frus-
trated on a showing that this would be an unauthorized changing of
the community property to separate property, depriving the non-acting
spouse of her (or his) testamentary power.20
1 72 PROP. § 6.3; 4 POWELL ff 616; Am. JUR. §§ 11, 13; C.J.S. § 3d; Annot. 157
A.L.R. 566 (1945), 46 A.L.R.2d 523 (1956), 69 A.L.R.2d 1058 (1960). Holohan v.
Melville, supra note 3, illustrates the possibility for controversy on the adequacy of
the expression of intent to have survivorship.
Is2 PROP. §§ 6.1, n. 10, 6.2; 4 POWELL %1 602, 616; Amr. JUR. § 11; C.J.S. § 3 c;
Anno. 62 A.L.R. 516 (1929).
19 Ibid., as regards statutes elsewhere. The Washington case of Volz v. Zang, 113
Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920) might be used to indicate direct conveyance, at least
between husband and wife, would be effective, but the preferential position of com-
munity property ownership may be the principal support for the conclusion that one
spouse can convey to both spouses (thereby changing separate property into com-
munity property).
20 In this respect, for instance, a title insurance company could not safely contract
that full title to a home was in a widower by survivorship if there were surviving
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As to real property, there exists a further problem of establishing
that survivorship has occurred. Not forgetting the problems of show-
ing that survivorship could have occurred, somehow there would need
to be a record showing that the death had occurred. Although there
is statutory provision for the issuance of a death certificate," there is
nothing which indicates that the certificate could be recorded by the
county auditor who keeps the land records, yet without such a record-
ing there would be the problem on each successive transfer of title to
the land of establishing the fact of survivorship. 2
It is recognized, of course, that these possible complications could
be avoided if the transaction was managed or arranged by a person
knowledgeable in the matter, but in nieasuring the desirability of the
adoption of joint tenancy law for Washington it cannot be ignored that
the likelihood is that there would be widespread uninformed use of the
device." But if the joint tenancy is effectively created the problem
descendants of the deceased wife. Notice that the wife could not prevent the husband,
as manager of community property, from investing the money in a home, and there is
nothing in such an acquisition which would indicate the wife would necessarily know
how the title was held. While this problem would not arise with regard to a "bank'
account where both spouses signed the account cards, it could arise with reference to
any asset where the acquirers did not somehow indicate acceptance of the form of
ownership. As to U.S. savings bonds, see In, re Alien's Estate, 154 Wash. Dec. 748,
343 P. 2d 867 (1959). For general discussion, see Comment Joint Tenancy in New
Mexico, 27 Rocxy M 'N. L. REv. 210 (1955); Miller, Joint Tenancy as Related to
Community Property, 19 CALin S. B. J. 61, 63 ff (1944) ; Brown and Sherman, Joint
Tenancy or Community Property: Evidence, 28 CALIF. S.BJ. 163 (1953).
In New Mexico to change from community property to joint tenancy holding re-
quires clear and convincing proof of intent of both parties, see In re Trimble's Estate,
57 N. Mex. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953) ; in Arizona, both apparently must agree and in
deed situations endorsement by the husband-wife joint tenant grantees on the deed seems
to be the approved way, Baldwin v. Baldwin, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791 (1937) ; Collier
v. Collier, 73 Ariz., 405, 242 P.2d 537 (1952) (but what about other sorts of assets?)
in California, one spouse not knowing the joint tenancy form can recapture the asset
for the community, or both can show community property ownership was intended
despite the joint tenancy form, Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App.2d 597, 272 P.2d
566 (1954) ; Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932) ; and in Texas, a
recent case held even knowledge and apparently agreement by both was not enough to
change an asset from community property into a holding permitting survivorship,
Hilley v. Hilley, 327 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). As to Idaho and Nevada,
though no cases were found, it is believed a comparable problem exists, and in Louisi-
ara which has no joint tenancy the approach with reference to U.S. saving bonds was
comparable in Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234, 37 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1953)
and the basis for the position of the Washington court in It re Allen's Estate, .upra.
There might also arise the problem, in proving either the joint tenancy or com-
munity property character of an asset, of surmounting the barrier of the "dead man's
statute!' RCW 5.60.030. Cf. Brown v. Davis, 98 Wash. 442, 167 Pac. .1095 (1917) (W
prevented from showing that community interest was to be preserved despite deed from
her to H, now deceased.)
21 RCW 43.20.090.
22 A comparable problem now exists under community property agreements putting
full title in the surviving spouse, and the bother and expense of getting the certified
copy of a death certificate arises. The title companies now, apparently, require that the
death certificate be delivered to them but do not try to have it recorded. Another pos-
sible complication to survivorship is discused in Wilson, Title Examiner Requirements
1960]
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becomes one of the likelihood that the purpose of saving "probate"
costs would be realized. If there is to be any saving it can only result
from the actual occurrence of survivorship.
As has been pointed out above, survivorship occurs only if the joint
tenancy continues until the death of a co-owner, and anything which
severs the joint tenancy prevents survivorship. In the simple situa-
tions of conveyance by one joint tenant of his share or involuntary
sale on execution of a joint tenant's share there is no question that
there is severance, but litigation to determine whether there has been
a severance is a potential as regards a number of other possible man-
ipulations of the share ownership."
At common law, execution of a mortgage by one joint tenant was a
severance just as was an absolute conveyance, but where the mort-
gagee's interest is only a lien, as in Washington, there exists the possi-
bility of arguing to the contrary on the analogy to a judgment lien,
which normally does not in itself affect the joint tenancy. Would an
attachment, with its interference with possession, result in severance?
Apparently normally not. What is the effect of a lease executed only
by one joint tenant? Is there such interference with the unities of
interest and possession that there is severance? Or perhaps survivor-
ship is only suspended and reattaches if the leasehold ends before
death of a joint tenant. Similar problems are raised if a life estate is
created by one of the joint tenants, though there may be more basis
to argue this must effect a severance immediately. If a concept of
suspension of the right of survivorship, without complete destruction
of it, is recognized, would it be applicable also during the period for
statutory redemption after the execution sale, with perhaps a relation-
back operation in the event death occurred during the statutory year? 5
in Event of Death of a Joint Tenant, 18 J.B.A. KANs. 211 (1950). If the deceased
joint tenant purports to devise the joint tenancy property to strangers and gives other
property to the surviving joint tenant, the survivorship may disappear by reason of
the election to take under the will, so the examiner must not only know of the death
but also be sure that the decedent did not set up an election possibility by will.
23 Here the lawyer is confronted with the economic complication common to most
unauthorized practice problems. Uninformed use of the joint tenancy device might well
engender litigation meaning substantial fees to lawyers, even greater than he would
(or might) lose through adoption of the device. It is assumed that support or opposi-
tion to the proposed initiative will not have such a basis.
24 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918 (1959); 2 PROP. § 6.2; 4 POWELL f 618; Am. JUR. §
14 ; C.J.S. § 4. See these references for the problems of the next paragraph of the text.
25 Or putting it another way, could the debtor joint tenant surviving the non-debtor
joint tenant acquire total ownership by redeeming from the execution sale after the
death of the non-debtor? Notice, if he can, successors and creditors of the non-debtor
would be wiped out by the relation-back survivorship 1i And the same problem could
arise if both co-owners were debtors and the survivor redeemed-would survivorship
cut out heirs, etc., of the decedent?
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If one joint tenant did not want to sell, but only to be free of co-
ownership inconveniences, partition would accomplish his purpose (just
as it does for tenants in common), and of course would sever the joint
tenancy destroying the survivorship, but the partition action would
have to reach judgment before the severance would occur. Does di-
vorce sever a joint tenancy? The courts do not agree. It is even pos-
sible to find severance consequences when both joint tenants act and
change the form of the asset, for example, by contracting to sell-
the proceeds may be held in tenancy in common, not joint tenancy. 26
And there are of course additional circumstances under which sever-
ance problems arise.
While it may be that in most joint tenancy situations there would
be no disturbance of the relationship through voluntary manipulations
by one joint tenant, there is no way to predict whether creditors would
exercise their rights with the resulting involuntary manipulations. But
even if it be assumed that creditors would not sever the joint tenancy,
a problem of interpretation of the language of the proposed initiative
could and probably would arise.27 In section 1 there is a proviso "That
such transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors." An
earlier sentence in the section states, "A joint tenancy shall have the
incidents of survivorship and severability as at common law." The
official ballot title (not the title of the proposed act) includes, "pro-
viding that the transfer of property to surviving joint tenants shall
not derogate from the rights of creditors." If the purpose of the pro-
viso is to permit a creditor to reach property in the hands of the sur-
vivor just as if there had been no joint tenancy, as the ballot title
suggests, it is doubtful whether the language is sufficient. As pointed
out above, survivorship is not transfer and the survivor's claim is not
in derogation of a creditor's right; rather, as regards survivorship, the
extent of the creditor's right is to prevent it by causing a severance of
the joint tenancy; if he does not, his debtor's interest in the property
upon which he depends has merely expired. Survivorship and severa-
bility "as at common law" ought to lead to these conclusions. Can the
proviso have any other meaning? Probably yes, for it could permit a
creditor to ignore the initial donative creation by his debtor of a joint
26 Initiative 208 requires a writing to create a joint tenancy-to meet this require-
ment probably would necessitate an appropriate recital in the contract that payments
were to be made to the sellers as joint tenants, otherwise the non-joint tenancy owner-
ship of the proceeds would seem to be inevitable.
27 Perhaps these observations merely demonstrate that legislation by initiative is
usually poor without regard to the merit of the basic proposal.
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tenancy between his debtor and another, and treat his debtor as sole
owner even though the debtor's conveyance could not be shown to be
in fraud of creditors; perhaps even permit the grantor's creditor to
reach property in the hands of joint tenant grantees who were donees
without showing the transfer was in fraud of creditors; and could per-
mit a community creditor to reach all of an asset changed into a joint
tenancy holding, even though he could not otherwise reach the half
interest of the non-debtor spouse. But obviously, whatever the pro-
viso means could not be stated with certainty without litigation.
Avoiding "probate" costs, as distinct from perhaps reducing them,
would not be so certain as it might seem. Notice, first of all, that
there would be no estate administration only if all assets were held in
joint tenancy. This presents the practical problem of making sure that
each asset, as acquired, was properly put into joint tenancy owner-
ship. Section 1 of the initiative requires some sort of a writing to
create a joint tenancy and would probably preclude establishing the
joint tenancy character of ownership through tracing." In this respect
a not uncommon factual situation could involve the sale of a home
owned in joint tenancy on an installment contract (or for that matter,
for cash). As indicated above, in the absence of express provision in
the contract there is disagreement among the courts whether the pro-
ceeds of the sale or the vendors' rights to future payments are held in
joint tenancy.
Most of the above discussion concerns technicalities of joint ten-
ancy law raising problems of real practical concern many, but not all
of which, might be avoided by a careful use of the device, although a
healthy skepticism can be held as to whether the problems would be
avoided. Frustration of expectations and unintended consequences can
follow from an uninformed use of the device, and certainly should be
considered in measuring the desirability of adding joint tenancy to
Washington law. Two illustrations may be used. It is not unknown
for a surviving spouse to take most or all assets through joint tenancies
to the exclusion of the children of the decedent, with an ultimate dis-
28 It is conceivable, of course, that some sort of an agreement between spouses, who
would be the ones most likely to be confronted with the problem, could be effective
to control the character of ownership of future acquisitions as now can be done with
respect to the community-separate property problems; but this would present problems
of establishing- the scope of the -agreement in- future transactions by the survivor as
well as the necessity of definitive ruling by- the supreme court on the efficacy of the
attempt.
The problem of joint tenancy ownership of contents of safe deposit boxes held in
"joint tenancy" has caused difficulties. Comment, 32 CALIF. L. REv." 301 (1944). The
California Statute of 1949 changed the situation. Calif. Rev. Code § 683.1.
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position either purposely or by intestacy to strangers when the sur-
vivor dies rather than to the stepchildren of the survivor. And probably
most lawyers and many laymen know of situations where a bank ac-
count went totally to one of several children by survivorship even
though the deceased parent had no desire or intention to prefer one
child over the others. There does not appear to be need to foster the
inadvertent promotion of family schisms.
To the extent that there may be much, the utility of joint tenancies
is probably greatest as between husband and wife (ignoring the pos-
sible complications suggested above from second marriages), but meas-
urement here requires consideration of community property rules. In
other community property states which do have general joint tenancies
it is recognized that one form of ownership is inconsistent with the
other so that a husband-wife joint tenancy is an ownership of separate
property by the two of them, not of community property." Two dif-
ferences are enough to indicate that this would be the expectable con-
clusion in Washington: First, neither joint tenant has the power to
dispose of his share by will whereas either the husband or the wife
can dispose by will of his or her half of the community property; 3
second, either joint tenant can convey his interest to strangers even
by gift, whereas, neither the husband nor wife can convey his or her
undivided interest in community property alone. 1
It may well be doubted whether a joint tenancy property relation-
ship between husband and wife rather than a community property
relationship would be advantageous to them. In some instances, per-
haps, but in others, no, and it seems to the writer that on balance the
question should be answered, no. The differences are stated for the
reader's own evaluation.
Neither husband nor wife alone can give community personal prop-
erty (even a half interest therein)32 whereas either could give his or
her half interest in joint tenancy property. The husband, as manager
of community property, has power to transfer all interest in personal
property, acting alone and for a community purpose-in effect, to sell, 3
29 Russo v. Russo, 80 Ariz. 365, 298 P.2d 174 (1956) ; Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal.
767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932) ; Jacquemart v. Jacquemart, 142 Cal. App.2d 794, 299 P.2d
281 (1956) ; In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N. Mex. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953) ( in effect).
Compare the problem of note 20, supra.
30 RCW. 11.04.050.
31 1"he reasoning of Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 Pac. 24 (1892) is con-
trolling: such division of community property is against public policy.




whereas even to sell joint tenancy property both owners would have
to act. The inconvenience to prospective purchasers might be great.
The rules governing real property held in joint tenancy are the same
as those applicable to personal property-either spouse can voluntarily
(sell or give) or involuntarily transfer his or her interest without the
concurrence of the other spouse. As to community real property, sub-
stantial protection is afforded the wife by the requirement that she
participate in voluntary transfers or encumbrances, whether sale or
gift.3
4
Business transactions involving community personal property are
likely to be simpler than those involving joint tenancy personal prop-
erty as the transferee need deal only with the husband; and those
involving real property are no more complex. Gift transactions involv-
ing full ownership are similar in both forms of ownership-both hus-
band and wife must participate. Gifts by one spouse to third persons
of a half interest are possible in joint tenancy holdings but not in
community property holdings, but notice that this would eliminate
any chance of taking by survivorship. Interference with the co-
ownership by creditors of both spouses does not differ in one holding
from the other, but creditors of one spouse alone could reach the
debtor spouse's joint tenancy interest though not his or her community
property interest." Thus it would appear that the likelihood of the
co-ownership continuing until the death of one spouse would be some-
what greater in community property holdings than in joint tenancy
holdings.
If there has been no interference with the co-ownership prior to
death of one spouse, total ownership will be in the surviving spouse
through joint tenancy survivorship, whereas it will not as to com-
munity property unless the decedent dies intestate and without de-
scendants or devises the share to the survivor." The decedent spouse
will not have been able to dispose of a half interest by will in joint
tenancy but will have been able to do so in community property.
Debts of the decedent cannot be enforced against the survivor in joint
tenancy, but can against at least the decedent's half in community
property." Although this insulation from some debts may be thought
advantageous it can well be doubted whether it is socially desirable,
34 RCW 26.16.040, and, e.g., Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn.2d 516, 188 P.2d 130
(1947).
35 Note 31, supra.
36 RCW 11.04.050.
37 Crawford v. Morris, 92 Wash. 288, 158 Pac. 957 (1916).
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and of course the possible insulation from a limited amount of indebt-
edness (even the survivor's) through an award in lieu of homestead,38
available as to community property, would not be available to joint
tenancy property held outside of estate administration through sur-
vivorship.-
But this is not the whole picture in Washington because of the
unique statutory authorization for a "community property agreement"
whereby the spouses can agree on the status and disposition of com-
munity property on the death of one of them." The simplest form of
agreement, that of survivorship to one spouse, may be first compared
with a joint tenancy. By this device survivorship can be assured
against the voluntary or involuntary act of one spouse alone, but no
such assurance can be had through joint tenancy.4 Survivorship under
either device would frustrate an attempt to dispose of an asset by
will.2 The joint tenancy result as to creditors is stated above; the
community property agreement survivorship would not defeat the
rights of creditors of the decedent."' Disposition upon death by joint
tenancy survivorship is limited to the simplest form, that is, the asset
is owned totally by the survivor. Under the community property agree-
ment statute there appears to be nothing to prevent the husband and
wife providing for complicated dispositions in favor of the survivor,
others, or the survivor and others, as they may desire, 4 which may
have important tax advantages." The lack of flexibility in disposition
under joint tenancy may well be a serious disadvantage.
The joint tenancy rules as to the effect of survivorship on creditors
could lead to a substantial change in credit practices. The careful
creditor might demand that both spouses obligate themselves for credit
8 RCW, c.11.52 particularly § 11.52.016.
9Although the decedent's debts would not be enforceable against the joint tenant
survivor, the orderly settlement of debts promoted by the non-claim statute and notice
to creditors (RCW, c.11.40) would also be lost and controversy might continue over
the survivor's liability despite survivorship or on grounds of independent obligation
of the survivor.
4ORCW 26.16.120. Bucldey, The Community Property Agreement Statute. 25
WAsHa. L. Rxv. 165 (1950).
41 That is, the inter vivos community property consequences outlined above are not
changed. It should be noted, however, that when the community property agreement
is made neither spouse alone can thereafter change the arrangement; as to joint ten-
ancy either can change the scheme as to half.
42 In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn.2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947) (community property
agreement controls against will).
43 RCW 26.16.120 provides in part "[T]hat any such agreement shall not dero-
gate from the right of creditors . . . " The sweep of the provision is unknown: for
example, could the decedent's separate creditor reach a half interest in what had been
community property, or are only "community" creditors protected?
4 Cf. In re Dunn's Estate, 31 Wn2d 512, 197 P.2d 606 (1948).
45 Suggested below following text to note 52.
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extended, whereas now the husband's act alone will obligate the family
assets which are community property without there being any liability
on the wife separately." The existence of joint tenancies might there-
fore in practice result in more widespread liability of married women.
It could well be that many times none of the complications identi-
fied above would affect the ownership in particular situations48 so that
on death of one joint tenant all assets in which he was interested would
be owned by the other joint tenant by survivorship. To what extent
would there be likelihood of reduced cost of transfer? There would
be no "probate" costs, as such; that is, there would be no administra-
tion of an estate because there would be no estate, and fees for a per-
sonal representative and an attorney for the estate would not be in-
curred. This is not the same as saying there would necessarily be no
attorney's fees, for there could well be a necessity for an attorney's
services, even though there was no estate, as regards such matters as
satisfying the tax authorities as to the amount of death taxes due or
that there were none due; and persuading third persons with whom
the survivor has dealings that survivorship has perfected ownership.
Some of these problems might well arise sometime after the death of
one joint tenant with attendant difficulties (and extra expense) of get-
ting adequate information and the possibility of interest costs added
to the basic tax obligations. Such complications are at least simpler
when the problems are promptly met during an estate administration.
Even if an attorney's services should not prove to be necessary there
would probably be costs to the survivor in time and money which can-
not fairly be ignored in estimating whether there would be saving
through joint tenancy use.
Tax burdens are not avoided by use of joint tenancies and they may
be greater. If an unmarried person put his property in joint tenancy
with another, there would then be a gift creating possible liability for
gift taxes,4" which if not paid at that time could result in additional
46 Unless of course the three-way liability of the family expense statute attached.
RCW 26.20.010.
47 CF. Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328 (1914).
48 Though this seems to the writer to be an unduly optimistic estimate which should
not be the basis of appraising the utility of adding joint tenancy to Washington law.
49 Both state, RCW 83.56.030; and federal, 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) § 2511, Reg. §
252511-1. In transactions involving modest amounts these taxes would not attach.
Both federal and state laws provide an annual exclusion of $3,000 for each donee 26
U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) §2503 (b) and RCW 83.56.050; and the federal lifetime (cumu-
lative) exemption of $30,000 of gifts by the donor, 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) § 2521 and
the state cumulative exemption of $10,000 for Class A donees and $1,000 for Class B
donees, RCW 83.56.040, would probably eliminate any likelihood of gift tax liability
in most small transactions, though notice that reporting of gifts in excess of the ex-
clusions would be required nonetheless.
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interest costs. In addition, upon death of one joint tenant, all of the
asset is included in the estate of the decedent for death taxes except
to the extent that the survivor can prove that his assets are the source.5"
The writers indicate that avoiding total inclusion in the estate of the
decedent is frequently impossible because of lack of sufficient evidence
to justify exclusion of part or all of the value of the joint tenancy
property.5' The practical problem also exists that a donor joint tenant
might think of the asset as still his and expect to continue to exercise
dominion over it. If this continued control is acceptable to the donee
joint tenant, he may find himself subject to income tax liability for
part of the income the asset produces even though he does not "feel"
himself yet to be owner of anything!52
A death tax complication that should not be overlooked arises from
the inflexibility of survivorship. In estates reaching into tax brackets,
passage of half the assets from the husband, H, would put total owner-
ship in the surviving widow, W, to be fully included in the estate of
the survivor; or put another way, would mean inclusion of 50 per cent
when H died and 100 per cent when W died for death tax purposes.
If H's half were made available to W for her lifetime and then went
to children (for example), the inclusions in the respective estates would
be H's 50 per cent in his estate and W's 50 per cent in hers but nothing
of H's half in W's estate. This example is, of course, oversimplified.
The possible tax reduction by avoiding joint tenancy survivorship can
be substantial.
If community property is changed into joint tenancy ownership there
apparently is no gift tax liability, assuming that the source can be ade-
quately proved, and only a half interest would be taxed on the dece-
dent's death. And similarly as to community property when one spouse
dies only half of the community property is included for death tax
purposes.
As the footnotes indicate, death taxation, as distinct from the prob-
lem of establishing no tax liability, probably would not affect the claim-
50 RCW 83.04.020; 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) § 2040, Reg. § 20.2040-1. Here, too,
the "small" estate probably will not present problems. As to the state inheritance tax
$40,000 of life insurance proceeds may be exempt and the Class A exemption of $5,000
plus $5,000 for a spouse, and for each child, stepchild, or adopted child living (or if
dead, per stirpes) can very well eliminate inheritance tax complications. Similarly, the$60,000 exem tion for f deral estate tax purposes an rem ve this area from concern
as to the small estate. However, the proof problem in the joint tenancy situation could
put some estates into the taxable brackets, though as between husband and wife the
marital deduction might eliminate or reduce the tax.
-'With the expense of attorney's fees involved, too! See references, note 15 supra.
52 And if the donee dies first, the donor may find himself paying death taxes on the
survivorship to himself unless he can prove he was the contributing source.
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ant to a small accumulation, but an extra income tax cost for the
survivor, even of the small accumulation, might be expectable. The
usual pattern apparently is that an asset owned by survivorship, a
home for example, is sold, resulting in a capital gain subject to income
taxation. The complication stems from the calculation of the basis to
be deducted from the proceeds to determine the capital gain. To the
extent that the asset was includible in the decedent's estate for estate
tax purposes the basis will be the value at death, but to the extent
that it was not includible the basis will be the original cost, not the
increased value at death.5" To illustrate, assume that community prop-
erty was used to buy joint tenancy property at $10,000, and when one
spouse died in 1959 the property was worth $20,000. In this instance
half of the property would be includible in the estate of the decedent
at $10,000 and would acquire that new basis; the other half would
retain its old $5,000 basis. Upon sale in 1959 or 1960 at $20,000 there
would be capital gain of $5,000 to the survivor taxable at a maximum
rate of 25 per cent or $1,250. If on the same financial facts, the prop-
erty had remained community property and had been devised to the
surviving spouse there would be no difference in death taxes and no
capital gains tax at all for the asset would acquire the new basis
totally, not merely as to one-half."'
Taxwise as between husband and wife, then, joint tenancy would
give no advantage over community property ownership and might re-
sult in major disadvantages. As between unmarried persons, splitting
the income during the continuance of the joint tenancy might result
in some tax advantage; there would be no advantage as to death taxes.5
It seems to the writer doubtful whether the possible advantage to un-
married joint tenants warrants adoption of a device which would most
likely be used principally by married persons as a substitute for com-
munity property ownership to their probable substantial disadvantage.
It seems likely that in many situations the adoption of joint tenancy
will not "Stop Probate with 208" as the slogan for the initiative pro-
claims, and even in instances where it would, that the purpose of the
sponsoring "Citizens Committee to Save Probate Costs" would not be
53 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) § 1014 (b) (9). P. H. Federal Taxes Par. 10449. In
Bordenave v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 820 (1957) change from community property
to joint tenancy prevented use by the survivor of the new basis at death of her husband
(totally under the then law) for purposes of calculating depreciation.
5426 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) § 1014 (b) (6). P. H. Federal Taxes Par. 10450; Rev.
Rul. 59-20, I.R.B. 1959-25.
55 Unless, conceivably, the posibility of concealing the taxable event (survivorship)
from the tax authorities, but though more difficulty might be encountered it can be
assumed some method to exact the taxes would be evolved.
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realized except of course in the most technical, but not practical, sense.
There is widespread misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of pro-
bate and administration of decedents' estates, and misinformation on
both the calculation and reasonableness of the attorney's fee attendant
thereon, though attorneys who keep their clients fully informed of the
steps taken and work done in the administration usually have clients
who are not dissatisfied. It is also true that many laymen do not ap-
preciate the advantages of disposing of their property by will and are
convinced of many "truths" that are not so.
There remains the more serious question whether, granting or as-
suming the reasonableness of the attorney's fees, there should not be
some simplification of probate procedures so that death costs (other,
obviously, than death taxes) can be reduced, particularly in small es-
tates. A source of recurring irritation to surviving spouses is the dis-
covery that community property has now changed into a co-ownership
with descendants of the intestate decedent. A simple change in the
inheritance statute so that all community property would be owned by
the surviving spouse would cure this. On the other hand there may be
situations in which the decedent for sufficient reasons would not desire
this result, and therefore the testamentary power which each spouse
has over half the community property should be preserved.
In addition, the usefulness of the statutory community property
agreement can be increased, and the willingness of attorneys to sug-
gest its use nourished, by legislation delineating its flexibility and pro-
viding a simple procedure to establish that creditor's rights are
promptly asserted or barred."
Unless the lawyers furnish leadership in solving the problems which
prompt such proposals as Initiative 208 they can expect continuing
efforts by others even if the present proposal falls. It is the writer's
further belief that the purposes of the sponsors of the initiative prob-
ably would not be achieved but rather a sizeable net disadvantage to
the residents of Washington would result, and that any expansion of
joint tenancy would merely add undesirable complexities to the law.
56 Or perhaps both for "probate' and "community property agreement!' succession
the successor could have an election confirmed by the court to assume outstanding
obligations and get essentially immediate distribution or to follow some non-claim
procedure to bar non-appearing creditors-particularly if the estate went to the sur-
viving spouse or perhaps to the surviving spouse and children.
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